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This paper analyses the incentive properties of prospective payment systems for 
hospital contracts, a key feature in many health systems’ reforms. Building on current 
literature, the model explicitly allows for the existence of waiting time, modelled as 
adversely affecting patients’ utility and therefore reducing social welfare. The model 
shows that rewarding hospitals for their demand leads to the first best solution, 
identified with respect to the relevant quality and quantity variables. The additional 
separate payment of a price per case is instead required when the social cost of 
waiting is introduced alongside the private costs. 
 




The last two decades have witnessed major changes in the organisation of health 
services. Various factors, among which the aging of the population and technical 
progress, led to growing demand levels and expectations; then to discontent, cost 
increases and general financial crisis. In general terms this scenario has characterised 
  1(and still characterises) many European countries: thus the need to reform the system. 
Unlike the US, that heavily relies upon private insurance, most European countries 
share strong traditional equity aims that descend from the consideration of health as a 
social good; as a consequence European reforms typically did not affect the general 
finance of health services, based on income tax or social insurance, but the 
mechanisms that regulate their provision (Saltman et al. 2002).  
As regards the provision of hospital services, almost invariably the main 
change consisted in the introduction of prospective payment systems (PPS) that pay a 
fixed price per unit of output (price per case), in place of the traditional cost-
reimbursement rules based on historical costing. By making hospitals the residual 
claimants for their costs PPS give strong incentives to economic efficiency, although 
this could be at the expenses of quality levels. The US introduced this system in 1983, 
along with a system of DRGs (diagnostic related groups) to classify cases and their 
costs and therefore define their prices. The UK was one of the first European 
countries to reform their health system, with the White Paper Working for Patients in 
1990 that introduced an internal market for hospital services. Even though the “quasi-
market” system was subsequently eliminated, the main changes introduced by the 
reform remained in place: the clear separation of purchasers (demand) and providers 
(supply) of hospital services, the independent hospital trusts, the use of contracts, or 
now “agreements”, for the payment of their services via PPS. Other countries have 
then followed, and are following, along very similar lines, and the debate about 
different payment systems for hospital services is then on top of their political 
agendas.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the properties of PPS by explicitly allowing 
for the existence of waiting lists. Building on a model by Chalkley and Malcomson 
  2(1998a) waiting time is introduced as a measure of hospitals’ demand taking into 
consideration the adverse effects that it has on patients utility, and therefore on social 
welfare. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 identifies the framework of 
analysis and reviews the existing literature on the topic. Section 3 analyses more in 
detail the work of C&M: this is the basis for the waiting lists model developed in 
Section 3. Section 4 relaxes one of the assumptions of the model and analyses the case 
in which private and social costs are different. Conclusions are in Section 5. 
Appendices 1, 2 and 3 discuss different extensions to the main model. 
 
2. The literature on PPS. 
 
There is a very large literature on the incentive properties of different payment 
systems to hospitals, mainly but not exclusively from the US (good reviews of the 
main issues of contracting in the NHS are in Barker et al., 1996, and in Chalkley and 
Malcomson, 1996a,b, 1998c). Its main characteristic is that of dealing with a 
multitask agency problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) that is expressed in at 
least two potentially conflicting objectives: reducing the costs of the service without 
reducing the quality level. Cost reimbursement rules, that pay the hospitals on the 
basis of the costs they actually incurred, lack the incentives for cost reduction. On the 
other hand prospective payment systems make the hospital the residual claimant for 
its costs giving powerful incentives to reduce them (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
However, this can lead to too low a quality level, as quality is costly but usually 
unmeasurable and unenforceable by contract. This is the key problem discussed by 
the literature. The superiority of PPS is acknowledged in all cases, although more 
complex forms of payment can be devised depending on the particular assumptions 
  3made, or characteristics considered: whether demand comes from privately insured 
patients, the degree of asymmetric information between purchasers and providers 
(about their costs and/or the quality level of the service), the heterogeneity of 
providers or patients, and so on. 
 
A good general set up of the problem is given by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a,b). 
The model describes the contractual relationship between a self-interested provider, 
that maximises its financial surplus, and a purchaser that maximises a social welfare 
function that depends on the number of cases treated and on the quality level of the 
treatment. The original demand for treatment comes from an exogenously given 
number of patients but the actual, final demand comes from the purchaser who buys 
hospital services for them. The purchaser is assumed to know the costs and to 
correctly perceive the quality level of hospital services. The model shows that a PPS 
that rewards hospitals on a price per case basis is not optimal, unless the system is 
demand constrained, because it leads to the treatment of too many patients; the first 
best solution is achieved by rewarding hospitals separately for the people they treat 
and for those that ask for treatment. The result holds true under different capacity 
constraints as well as when assuming different quality dimensions. If instead buyers 
do not infer quality correctly  (1998b) only a second best solution can be achieved, by 
means of a mixed system that combines the fixed price per case to a partial cost 
reimbursement. Block contracts (simpler agreements that paid the hospitals a 
predefined amount of money in exchange for a total amount of services, very common 
in the first years of the UK reform) can be used only when assuming, following 
Newhouse (1970), that hospitals are not profit-maximising units but have ethical 
concerns, and only if the system is demand-constrained. 
  4More or less complicated prospective payment systems, that allow for different prices 
or for a cost reimbursement element, are also the solutions to the models of Ellis and 
McGuire (1986, 1991), Ma (1994), Rogerson (1994), Ellis (1998) and De Fraja 
(2000).  
An issue that has not been given much consideration in the analysis of contracts is 
that of waiting time. In the contracting context, the existence of waiting lists has been 
usually considered as an indirect measure of quality, often to explain the demand for 
private insurance (Besley et al., 1999; Propper 2000). As mentioned in the 
introduction, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature by 
extending the model of Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) (C&M from now on) to the 
case in which an explicit role is given to the existence of waiting time; this will be 
considered as a measure of hospital demand, taking into consideration the adverse 
effects that it has on patients utility, and therefore on social welfare. 
 
3. The C&M model. 
 
The situation modelled by C&M is the definition of a contract between a purchaser of 
hospital services and a self-interested hospital. The purchaser buys the services for the 
patients, and it maximises a social welfare function. The hospital maximises a utility 
function that is increasing in its financial surplus. The contracting system and the 
determination of the purchaser’s budget are taken as given, and no ethical or 
professional considerations enter the hospital’s utility function. 
 
The logic and the structure of the model can be summarised as follows. The two 
objective functions are identified and maximised with respect to the relevant 
  5variables, so that two sets of first order conditions (F.O.C.) are identified. As the 
hospital’s utility function depends on the (kind of) payment it receives, the point is to 
choose a payment system that equates the two sets of F.O.C., so that the hospital 
makes a choice that maximises social welfare. This result is defined as a first best 
solution. 
 
More in detail, define b(x,q) as the benefit perceived by the purchaser of treating x 
patients with quality level q. This is increasing in both variables and strictly concave 
in q.  
C(x,q,f) is the cost for the hospital and is assumed to be increasing, convex in x and 
strictly convex in q; f is the effort in cost reduction. The cost is assumed to be known 
to the purchaser, whereas q cannot be monitored and so cannot be enforced by 
contract. 
 
Utility for the hospital is given by  
U = s – v(x,q,f)        
where s is the financial surplus and v a disutility component. Reservation utility for 




The social welfare function can be written as 
(1)  W= [b(x,q) – s – C(x,q,f)] + [s – v(x,q,f))] - α[C(x,q,f) + s]     
where  α >0 is to allow for distortions from raising revenue from taxation. The 
purchaser is maximising (1) subject to the constraint 
(2)  s – v(x,q,f) ≥         
−
v
  6Rearranging (1) and observing that it is a decreasing function of s, so that (2) will 
always hold as an equality, it can be rewritten as 
(3)  W = b(x,q) – (1+α)[C(x,q,f) + v(x,q,f)] -α        
−
v
The hospital objective function is to maximise 
(4)  H = s – v(x,q,f)     s.t.    B(x,y,C) – C(x,q,f) – s = 0      
B(.) is the total payment received by the hospital and it can be made dependent on the 
number of cases x, on the demand y(q), which is assumed to be increasing in quality, 
or on costs depending on the contract chosen, but it cannot be directly a function of q. 
So for example with a simple price per case contract B = px; with cost reimbursement 
B=C(x,q,f); with partial cost sharing B = px + ϕC, and so on. Thus hospital revenues 
can be affected by quality only via the effect that this has on demand. 
The model consists of maximising (3) and (4) with respect to x, q and f under the 
further constraint that 
(5) x ≤            ) (q x
−
where   is the maximum number of patients that can be treated by a hospital and 





 = min[y(q), k] 
that is the minimum value of demand y(q)  and the capacity (maximum possible 
supply) of the hospital, k. 
If (3) subject to (5) is maximised at x
*, q
* and f
*, the problem is to find the payment 
system  B(.) that maximises (4) subject to (5) at exactly the same values. 
Mathematically, this is done by substituting the solutions to the purchaser’s F.O.C. in 
the hospitals’ F.O.C. A first best solution exists if there is a payment system that 
  7guarantees that the equations hold. This first best solution means that hospitals will 
choose to treat the optimal number of patients, at the optimal quality level. 
 
The following results are obtained by C&M. 
1)  For the case of a demand constrained system, that is when  
x
* = y(q
*) < k 
the payment of a lump-sum transfer T (required to ensure that (2) always holds as an 
equality) and the use of a price per case contract of the form B = px leads to the 
desired result if the price p = ∂B/∂x = Bx
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+ + − =
α
α       
evaluated at the socially optimal values. That is, (6) reflects the marginal benefit of 
treating an additional patient and the marginal benefit of quality, calculated from the 
marginal increase in demand, all net of the cost of tax distortion. 
2) If the system is unconstrained or capacity constrained, that is respectively 
x
*≤   *) (q x
−
and 
*) ( * q y k x < =  

















        
 
                                                 
1 All variables with a subscript represent a derivative 
  8Two different prices are in (7), a price per case Bx and a price per patient demanding 
treatment By. The optimal price per case equals the marginal benefit at the number of 
cases treated; the optimal price per patient demanding treatment reflects the marginal 
benefit of quality for the marginal patient; both prices are net of the marginal cost of 
tax distortion. 
 
The rationale of the results is the following. A fixed price per case set as in (6) leads 
to the efficient outcome. Hospitals increase the quality level up to q
* in order to attract 
patients, and treat all the patients demanding treatment at that quality level. This 
works only if the system is demand constrained. In the case of an unconstrained 
system, the optimal number of cases to treat at the optimal quality level is lower than 
the number of people demanding treatment. If hospitals are rewarded for the number 
of people they treat, they will have an incentive to treat too many. Rewarding them 
separately for the number of treatments and for the number of referrals for future 
treatment (i.e. for their demand) solves the problem. A similar argument, but for 
opposite reasons, applies in the case of a capacity constraint. If the hospital cannot 
treat more than k patients it doesn’t need to increase its level of quality up to q
* in 
order to attract them, and will therefore choose too low a quality level. Finally, a 
payment system like (7) works efficiently in all cases, i.e. whether the system is 
constrained or unconstrained.  
In all cases the optimal setting of the price makes hospitals choose f*. This comes 
from the fact that being the residual claimants of their costs gives them the incentives 
to cost minimisation. 
 
 
  94. The waiting lists model. 
 
For a competitive market and with convex costs, C&M show that a linear pricing 
system can lead to the first best solution: hospitals have an incentive not to reduce 
quality levels in order to attract patients, which are their source of income. Quality 
does not need to be monitored or specified in the contract; all that is required is 
observability of demand and that this is responsive to quality. A reputation effect 
reinforces the argument in the case of short term contracts. 
  
The assumption of demand observability is strictly linked with the discussion of the 
role of waiting lists, which are considered below. The assumption of demand’s 
responsiveness to quality is less critical when demand does not come directly from 
patients but is filtered by medical professionals, who are in a better position to collect 
and process information about the quality of treatment provided by different hospitals. 
This is equivalent to considering health care as a search good and not an experience 
good (as it is for the single patient), thus avoiding much of the informational problems 
that are typical of the sector. 
 
The main change brought to the C&M model is the introduction of waiting lists. 
These are considered as a measure of patients’ demand, and thus an indirect measure 
of quality, taking into consideration that they negatively affect patients’ utility. The 
model is constructed as follows. 
 
If patients get treatment of quality q, their utility from this treatment can be defined as 
(8)  U = q          
  10If treatment is postponed by w periods, where w is the time length of the waiting list, 
then (8) must allow for a discounting factor reflecting time preference, and for a 
factor reflecting the risk of a worsening of patients conditions while waiting.  
 
Define r the time preference factor and h the conditional probability of “dying” at 
time t, having survived until then
2, the expected utility of a patient is 
(9)  U = qe
-w(r+h)          
Now define g as the number of people in front of a patient in the queue; its change 
over time will be given by 
(10)  hg x
dt
dg
− − =            
where x is the number of cases treated. Considering a steady state situation in which x 














− ) (                                           
Equation (11) means that the number of people in front of a person in the queue is a 
function of G (the number of people at the beginning, when t = 0) and it decreases 
with time, partly because they are treated partly because they die. When t = w then 
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Moreover, the number of people in a queue changes over time as 
                                                 
2 In particular, F(t) is the probability distribution function of dying at any point in time;  
e







=  is the conditional probability. 
 
  11(13)  hG x y
dt
dG
− − =          
where y is the number of people joining a queue, or each hospital’s demand. In steady 
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Equation (15) is an expression of the expected utility of joining a queue at hospital i, 
and in equilibrium this value will be the same for every hospital. 
 
 
In the social welfare function the benefit is now the expected utility of a cohort of 
patients asking for treatment at all hospitals at time 0; hospitals’ costs are discounted 
by a factor e
-rw= (x/y)
r/h as they will be incurred only after w periods. The same 
discount rate r is assumed for both patients and hospitals, but these assumptions will 
be relaxed in the next section.   
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In this case  is the present value of the hospitals’ reservation utility. 
−
v
  12On the hospitals’ side, the objective function is like in C&M but with the cost-
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where U is the level of utility available at other hospitals. 
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which is the hospitals’ objective function. Following on C&M results, in (18) the 
payment system B(.) has been directly specified as a function of the number of cases 
treated and the volume of demand (the proof of the non-optimality of other payment 
schemes is redundant and therefore not included). 
 
The simultaneous maximisation of (16) and (18) with respect to x, q and f leads to the 
following system of F.O.C. 
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To proceed (19) is equated with (22), (20) with (23) and (21) with (24).  
First of all, (21) and (24) will always be the same, that is hospitals have an incentive 
to maximise the effort in cost reduction, i.e. with a prospective payment system they 
will always choose f*. As regards the choice of x and q, solving with respect to the 
price variables leads to 
(25) 
hqx
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Equation (26) is the same price per patient demanding treatment as in C&M (see 
equation (7)) except for the presence of the discount factor and its sensitivity to 
quality changes. As could be expected, the optimal price, and hence the marginal 
benefit for the hospital, equals the marginal social benefit, net of a portion α of the 
marginal cost. This result indicates that it is optimal to pay the hospital a fixed sum T 
and then a fixed price for every person asking for treatment by entering its waiting 
list, and a zero price for the number of people actually treated. 
 
  14This apparently counterintuitive result stems from the way demand was modelled. On 
the one hand, hospitals have an incentive to increase the quality level of their service: 
they are paid on the basis of their demand and, given the assumptions, a higher quality 
attracts more people. On the other hand, however, more people demanding treatment 
translate into a longer waiting time, and this in turn acts negatively on demand. In 
order to counteract this effect hospitals will decide the number of people they want to 
treat, as the more patients are treated the shorter is the waiting time. In other words 
the adjustment towards equilibrium can be described as an adjustment towards an 
optimal waiting time; rewarding hospitals on the basis of their demand gives them 
immediate and direct incentives over q and also indirect incentives over x. Also, in the 
presence of waiting time targets it could counterbalance the potential incentive to find 
ways to exclude (new or current) patients from the queue, giving them the funding in 
advance to treat them. As shown more in detail in Appendix 1, if only a price per case 
were paid only a second best solution could be achieved, in which a lower quality 
level is traded off with a higher number of treatments. For example hospitals could 
reduce the length of stay and move towards a “quick” treatment of patients on a day 
basis, not a totally unfamiliar scenario in reformed systems.  
The first best solution can be achieved also when allowing for hospitals and patients 
to have different discount factors for time preference, and when modelling the market 
as an oligopoly; in both cases the only difference is the price level, which is higher the 
more patients dislike being in a queue, or the fewer providers are on the market. 
These two cases are discussed respectively in Appendices 2 and 3.   
A different result is instead obtained when relaxing the implicit assumption that social 
and private costs are the same and the “cost of the loss” of patients getting worse or 
  15dying while waiting is introduced in the social costs. This is explored in the next 
section. 
 
4.  The social “cost of the loss”. 
 
So far, the only costs that have been considered are the “production” costs of the 
hospital and its disutility. It is realistic however to consider that, from a social welfare 
point of view, the fact that people might get worse while they wait and eventually die 
has a cost, other than their own cost from waiting. In other words, not only people, but 
also society, are worse off the longer they have to wait; the events of getting worse 
and eventually dying carry a cost, that includes rather unmeasurable as well as more 
measurable elements (for example the payment of benefits to people when they 
cannot work). Call this “cost of the loss” γ. This has to be introduced in the social 
welfare function that the purchaser is assumed to be maximising. This means that 
social and private costs are now different. 
The cumulative distribution of the probability of dying at time t is 
F(t) = 1 – e
-ht
If γ is the social cost of the loss, the expected social cost today of having y persons 
getting worse between now and w is given by 
(27)             dt e yh
w
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A new expression for the welfare function can now be rewritten as 
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Applying the same procedure as in all previous cases, the result is now different, i.e. 
(30) 
hqx

















        
The value of the price per person asking for treatment (By) is the same as in (25), but 
in this case a positive price per case (Bx) is required, which is equal to the social cost 
of the loss itself. 
 
To interpret this result it is necessary to analyse what effect the introduction of γ has 
had on the equilibrium. To do so, let’s consider the following equations from the 
F.O.C. for welfare maximisation: 
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The effect that the introduction of γ has had on the optimal values of x and q can be 
calculated by totally differentiating (31) and (32), which results in 
(33) 
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In matrix notation this can be rewritten as 

















where H is the Hessian matrix of the second order derivatives of the welfare function. 



















        
 
From the second order conditions the determinant of the Hessian matrix is known to 



























This means that the introduction of γ always produces an increase in the number of 
patients to treat, whereas the effect on the quality level depends on the size of the 
cross derivative of the hospital cost and disutility function. To shed more light on the 
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  18then Wxq>0, that is the marginal benefit of quality increases with the number of cases 
and the sign of 
dx
dq
 (obtained via the total differentiation of (32)) is positive. The 
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This means that if (38) is true then an increase in the number of cases makes an 
improvement in quality more valuable to society. The increase in the optimal number 
of cases brought about by γ will therefore lead to a higher level of quality. The 
opposite holds in the case when (39) is true. Another way of looking at this is via the 
behaviour of the average cost function. From the convexity assumptions of the total 
cost function made at the beginning, the average cost per case (C+v)/x is an 
increasing function of both x and q, that is the average cost of treating a patient gets 
higher the more patients are treated and/or the higher is the quality level. 
 
The implication of (38) is that the average cost will tend to increase with quality less 
when the hospital treats more people. If instead (39) is true then the increase in the 
average cost per case will be higher the higher is the number of patients treated. In the 
first case, a social welfare function that includes the cost of the loss will be maximised 
by increasing both quantity and quality; in the second case, the increase in the optimal 
number of cases will lower the socially optimal quality level. 
 
Even if this last hypothesis might seem more reasonable to expect, the opposite 
cannot be ruled out a priori. This could be the case for example if in order to increase 
the number of patients to treat the hospital has to buy and use some particular 
  19equipment, or hire some specialised staff, and this has beneficial effects on the quality 
level of treatment that can be increased at a lower extra cost. 
 
In conclusion, the social cost of the loss introduces a difference between the social 
and the private cost functions, and the optimal number of cases is increased. As a 
consequence, a positive price per case is now required to give hospitals correct 
incentives. The optimal price per entry in the waiting list is determined in the same 
way as before, and its value will depend on whether the optimal quality level has 
increased or decreased. 
5. Conclusions. 
This paper has analysed the structure of a prospective payment system to hospitals 
taking explicitly into account the existence of waiting lists. Building on a paper by 
C&M, waiting time has been modelled as adversely affecting patients’ (and thus the 
social welfare maximising purchaser’s) utility. The model shows that rewarding 
hospitals for their demand, as opposed to their output, leads to a first best solution. 
The additional payment of a price per case is instead required when the social cost of 
waiting is introduced alongside the private costs. In both cases the payment of a 
positive price for every person entering the queue is essential: the equilibrium is 
reached via the direct incentive that this gives towards quality, in order to attract 
demand. The incentive to treat the socially optimal number of patients comes from the 
need to reduce the average waiting time that arises from a higher demand but at the 
same time negatively affects it.  
 As will be detailed in Appendix 1, the payment of a price per case leads instead to a 
second best solution, in which a lower quality could be traded off with a higher 
quantity. Hospitals could for example reduce the average length of stay (lower quality 
  20level) and/or move towards the treatment of patients on a day-basis, which could in 
turn increase the probability of being readmitted, and therefore possibly increase the 
average waiting time. This scenario is actually not totally unfamiliar to the reformed 
English NHS with the additional risk of hospitals hiding true information about the 
real length of their waiting lists when specific targets about these are imposed. The 
payment of a price per demand might reduce the extent of this last problem but its 
proper discussion goes beyond the aim of this paper, as it involves other issues, such 
as the determination of the purchaser’s budget, or the quality of their information.  
The paper is subject to other limitations, among which the assumption of perfect 
quality observability by purchasers, the modelling of quality as a one-dimensional 
variable, or the exclusion of the probability of readmission; all these are 
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  21Appendix 1 
Payment of a positive price per case and a zero price per demand. 
 
This appendix analyses the case in which the hospital is paid a positive price per case, 
Bx, and no price per person entering their queue, i.e. no price per demand By. 
The F.O.C from the maximisation of (16) and (18) become 
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Equations (A.3) and (A.6) are always the same, so the hospital is putting the required 
level of effort in cost reduction. 
Equation (A.1) implies that 
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and equation (A.4) implies that 














































to ensure that hospitals choose the optimal value of (Cx+vx). This does not guarantee 
that they will also choose x=x*, or that indeed it is optimal that they do so. In fact, 
now no instrument exists to give hospitals direct incentives to the right level of 
quality, as the comparison of (A.2) and (A.5) shows. As the cost function is strictly 
convex in q, hospitals will therefore choose q
H<q*. Having no direct control over it, 
the purchaser will take this lower level of quality as given. The effect that this sub-
optimal quality level has on the welfare function and on the final equilibrium can be 
seen by totally differentiating (A.1) that gives 
dWx = Wxqdq + Wxxdx 
so that dx/dq = -Wxq/Wxx
Concavity of the welfare function means that Wxx<0. For simmetry in cross 
derivatives from (A.2) one gets 
Wxq = 1-(1+α) Cxq
which will be positive or negative depending on the sign and size of Cxq. If Cxq >0 (as 
one might expect) and Cxq > 1/(1+ α) then Wxq<0, which implies dx/dq<0. In other 
words, the reduction in the quality level can lead to an increase in the optimal quantity 
level, i.e. the one that re-maximises the social welfare function.  
  23This second best solution can now be achieved by setting the (new) optimal price per 







  24Appendix 2 
Different discount factor. 
 
If people’s discount factor for time preference is different from that of hospitals, call 
the former δ and the latter r, and the objective functions can be re-written as 
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Proceeding as in the rest of the paper, the following results are obtained 
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The result and its rationale are therefore unchanged. It is still optimal to reward 
hospitals on the basis of their demand, paying them a fixed price per person entering 
  25the queue, calculated as in section 1. In this case, as can be seen from (A.10) or 
(A.11), an increase in δ will have a positive effect on the price By, meaning that a 
stronger dislike for waiting leads to a higher payment per patient to the hospital. 
Unfortunately, the calculation of the effect of δ on the equilibrium is inconclusive. 
Intuitively one might expect the higher marginal revenue to translate into an incentive 
to increase x and q, in order to increase y, possibly leading to higher equilibrium 
values of both quality and quantity. However, the outcome where either only x or q is 
increased cannot be ruled out. 
  26Appendix 3 
Oligopoly of supply. 
 
This appendix considers the case of an oligopolistic market with a finite number m of 
homogeneous hospitals. Whereas the homogeneity assumption might still be 
simplifying, the hypothesis of a finite number of hospitals is quite realistic, especially 
for local market conditions. The case is modelled as a Cournot-Nash game, in which 
hospitals decide their quality-quantity mix at the same time, taking the others’ 
decisions as given.  
This interaction between hospitals can be introduced in the model via a respecification 
of their demand function. In a symmetric case with m hospitals the demand of each 



















        
and the total market demand is 
∑ =
i
i y Y  
As a symmetric equilibrium is assumed, (A.12) can be equivalently rewritten as 


































        
 
Equation (A.13) shows that every decision made by hospital i about its quality or 
quantity level will affect it both directly, through the effect on its demand, and 
  27indirectly, through the effect on the others’ market shares. Differentiating (A.13) with 














































The same procedure as in section 1 is then used (maximise the social welfare function 
and the hospitals’ utility function and equate their F.O.C.) but using the above 
expressions for the marginal variation of demand with respect to quantity and quality, 
because this specification explicitly takes into consideration the number of firms and 
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This is exactly the same result of (25) multiplied by m/(m-1).  
Thus again, in the case of an oligopoly it is also optimal to pay hospitals a zero price 
for the number of cases treated and to reward them instead on the basis of their 
demand. It is therefore only the price per entrant to be influenced by the number of 
hospitals on the market. As can be seen by differentiating (A.14) with respect to m, 
the higher is this number the lower is the price and viceversa, provided that m ≥ 2. 
That is, the result does not hold in the case of a monopolistic provider. This is quite 
intuitive, as the whole model works on the adjustments of demand. In the case of a 
monopoly demand is fixed, as patients do not have any choice as of where to go to 
receive treatment. Formally this means that both yx and yq are zero. From the objective 
  28function of the hospital it can be easily seen that it would provide too low a quality 
level, even though a positive price per case could induce it to treat the right number of 
patients.  
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